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UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain.tiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
MATTHEW JAMES HINMON, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, and interference with an arresting officer, a 
class B misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78A-4-103(2)(d) (West Supp. 2012). 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant was caught red-handed selling drugs in a grocery store 
parking lot by one of the store's employees. When the store security 
officer - a 24 year veteran peace officer with the Division of Wildlife 
Resources -went to investigate, Defendant tried to hide the drugs and 
resisted arrest. 
Defendant moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that the 
officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him and probable cause to 
arrest him. When the trial court denied his motion, Defendant entered a 
conditional guilty plea under State v. Sery. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Were Defendant's detention and arrest reasonable under the Fourth 
Amend1nent to the United States Constitution? 
Standard of Reviezo. A trial court's decision on a motion to suppress is a 
mixed question of fact and law. The factual findings underlying a trial 
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are 
reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, if 11, 100 P.3d 1222. 
The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for 
correctness, including its application of the legal standard to the facts. State 
v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, if 15, 103 P.3d 699. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions and statutes are reproduced 
in Addendum A: 
• U.S. Const. amend IV; 
• Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-305 (West 2013) (interference with an 
arresting officer); 
• Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37-8 (West 2013) (possession of a controlled 
substance) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary off acts. 1 
Tip from a Citizen-Informant 
Mark Raines, a long-time Harmon's grocery store employee, went to 
his car on a work break and stumbled upon Defendant "selling narcotics." 
R284:3-5, 10. Raines noticed the small, green Geo metro parked next to him 
because it was "very suspicious." R284:3. The Geo had a welded-shut 
passenger side-door and was back-end parked on the west-side of the 
building-where employees park-not customers. R284:4-5, 15; R286:B 
(Worthington written statement). Raines, who could see clearly into the 
Geo, saw Defendant sitting in the passenger seat. R284:4. When Defendant 
noticed Raines, he gave Raines a "what are you looking at kind of look." 
R284:29. Defendant then "lurched forward and almost kind of covered up 
what was going on." R284:4. 
1 The facts are taken from the trial court's findings and the record 
upon which it relied, including the evidentiary hearing, the preliminary 
hearing, and the witness staten1ents. Notably missing from the record is, 
Officer Loken' s witness statement, which was relied on by the trial court in 
its Ruling. R170-192; see State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 'jf11, 12 P.3d 92 
( defendant bears the burden of ensuring the record is adequate and any 
gaps in the records are consh·ued against defendant). 
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Raines continued to his own car, which was on the driver's side of the 
Geo. R284:4. Looking into the Geo from the driver's side, Raines saw that 
Defendant had a towel on his lap with about 20 little pink balloons sitting 
on top of it. R284:4, 8. Defendant appeared to be manipulating the balloons 
with his hands. R284:29; R286:A (Raines written statement). Based on his 
own drug history-a past citation for marijuana paraphernalia-and what 
he had seen on T.V., and in particular, "court TV, anything like that," Raines 
concluded that he was witnessing a drug transaction. R284:4-5, 10. 
Raines immediately moved his car to the front of the store, went back 
inside the store, and reported what he had seen to his manager, Chris 
Worthington, and Harmon's on-duty security officer, Officer Raymond 
Loken. R284:5-6. Raines told Worthington and Loken that he saw a small, 
green Geo back-end parked "on the west side" of the building, that the 
passenger had "a bunch of pink balloons" in his lap, and he believed that 
the passenger was selling heroin to the driver. R284:6; 15, 29; R176; R177; 
R286:B (Worthington written statement). Loken, a 24 year veteran peace 
officer with the Division of Wildlife Resources and part-time security officer 
at the store, went to the parking lot to investigate with Worthington and 
Raines in-tow. R284:29-30. 
-4-
Loken' s Investigation of Raines' tip 
After Raines pointed out the car, Loken, with Worthington and 
Raines behind, approached the car's passenger-side and peered in. R284:30-
31. Loken saw Defendant manipulating something II on the towel in the 
middle of his lap." R284:31; R285:10-11. 
When Loken tried to get a closer look at what was on the towel, the 
driver and Defendant spotted him. R284:31; 285:10-11. Defendant was 
startled by Loken, and gave Loken II this real deer in the headlights 
look."R284:31. Loken then told Defendant, "don't move." R285:11; R175, 
R178. Defendant responded by shoving the towel and its contents between 
his knees, to the car floor. R285:11. Then, Defendant shouted at the driver, 
"take off, take off" and reached for the car's gearshift. R284:16. 21. 
Loken's immediate thought was that Defendant was either "hiding 
contraband" or "going for a weapon." R285:6-7; 11-13. Thus, Loken reached 
into the car through the open passenger window to "try to control" 
Defendant's hand, and II to protect" himself. R285:6. 
Loken grabbed Defendant's hands and said "Police officer, you' re 
under arrest." R285:7, 14. But Defendant II continued to struggle." R285:7; 
R284:33. Defendant broke his right arm free, reached to the car floor, and 
screamed at the driver, "Eat it, eat it" "Start your car," "go, go." R286:B 
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(Worthington written statement); R284:32-33. Worthington, who was 
outside of the car watching, ran to the car's driver's side, took the keys from 
the ignition, and escorted the crying driver from the car. R284:16; R286: B 
(Worthington written statement). 
As Loken tried to gain conh·ol of Defendant's hands, he repeatedly 
told Defendant "[S]top resisting," "[Y]ou're under arrest," "[G]ive me your 
hands." R284:33. But Defendant continued to struggle and lurched "really 
hard up over the seat." R285:33-34. At that point, Loken had control over 
Defendant's left hand, but not his right. R285:33. With his feet on the 
passenger side of the car, Defendant heaved his body "between the seats" 
"towards the back." R284:33. Worthington then saw Defendant "shove his 
hand into his mouth," trying to eat a little pink balloon. R284:16-17. When 
the balloon bounced into the back of the car, Worthington reached through 
the driver side of the car, retrieved the balloon, and then grabbed 
Defendant's right arm. R284:17, 34. 
At Loken's request, Raines grabbed Loken's handcuffs and, with 
Loken's and Worthington's help, handcuffed Defendant. R284:34. Draper 
police arrived shortly thereafter and field tested the substance in the little 
pink balloon that Worthington had seized. R285:18; R284:35. It tested 
positive for heroin. R285:18. 
-6-
B. Summary of proceedings. 
~ Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance, a 
third degree felony, and interference with an arresting officer, a class B 
misdemeanor. Rl-3. After a preliminary hearing, Defendant was bound 
over as charged. R285:21. 
Motion to Suppress. Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress the 
balloon and the field test results identifying its contents as heroin, arguing 
that the evidence was obtained from an unlawful search and seizure. R71-
76. Defendant argued that Loken and Worthington violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause and that 
discovery of the heroin-filled balloon was the fruit of the unlawful arrest. 
R71-77. 
Trial Court's Ruling. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and 
heard oral argument. R284, 283. The trial court then denied Defendant's 
motion in a 23-page ruling. R170-192. In its ruling, the trial court 
acknowledged that there were some inconsistencies in the testimony, but 
found that generally, the testimony was consistent. R175. The court also 
recognized that this event occurred "very quickly," that [ d]ifferent 
witnesses observe and remember things differently," and that "testimony 
may vary over time." R175-176. The court based its findings "upon the 
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record, considering all versions, the thning of the version, the context for 
each version," and "the corroboration of each version." R176. 
The court then made conclusions of law. R182. First, the court 
concluded that Loken and Worthington were acting under color of law, and 
thus had to follow the Fourth Amendment. It concluded that Raines was a 
citizen-informant. R183. 
Second, the court concluded that Loken detained Defendant when he 
told Defendant "don't move." R185. The court reasoned that Loken "made 
an official show of authority that a reasonable person would interpret as a 
command to restrict his movement" and that a reasonable person would not 
be "free to disregard" the request. R185. The trial court concluded that 
reasonable suspicion supported the Defendant's detention. R185. The court 
ruled that Raines was a reliable informant who provided a sufficiently 
detailed tip that was verified by Loken. R186-188. 
Third, the trial court found that Loken lawfully arrested Defendant 
when he physically restrained him. R189-190. The court found that "all of 
the events leading up to the arrest" from Raines' tip to Loken grabbing 
Defendant, "viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police 
officer," amounted to probable cause. R190. 
-8-
Last, the trial court concluded Worthington's seizure of the balloon 
fell under the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment 
and that the balloon was admissible at trial. R190-191. 
Conviction, Sentence, and Appeal. Defendant entered conditional 
guilty pleas to both charges under State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 
1988), reserving his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his suppression 
motion. R194-195. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a suspended 
prison term of 0-5 years for his possession of a controlled substance 
conviction and 180 days in jail for his interference with an arresting officer 
conviction. R224. Defendant timely appealed. R238. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to 
suppress. Defendant first contends that four of the trial court's factual 
findings are clearly erroneous findings. He then contends his detention and 
arrest violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
None of his contentions have merit. 
First, a trial court's findings are reviewed for clear error. This Court 
will sustain a trial court's factual findings so long as the record contains 
some evidence of that finding. A trial court may draw inferences from the 
evidence, relying on its own experience and judgment. Here, the trial 
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court's findings are supported by the evidence from the preliminary 
hearing, evidentiary hearing, and witness statements. But even if the h·ial 
court had erred in making any of those findings, those alleged errors do not 
undermine the trial court's basis for denying Defendant's suppression 
motion. 
Second, the trial court properly concluded that Defendant's detention 
was supported by reasonable suspicion. An officer can develop reasonable 
suspicion from an informant's tip when that the tip has sufficient indicia of 
reliability. Here, Raines report of ongoing drug activity provided Loken 
with reasonable suspicion. Because Raines was a concerned and identified 
citizen-informant, his report was highly reliable. Moreover, Raines' tip was 
highly detailed, contemporaneous with the drug activity, and corroborated 
by Loken. Therefore, Raines tip alone created reasonable suspicion, and, 
under the totality of the circumstances test, Loken, at the time of the 
detention had specific, articulable facts that reasonably suggested that 
Defendant may be involved in criminal activity. Thus, Loken' s detention 
was supported by reasonable suspicion. 
Finally, the trial court properly concluded that Defendant's arrest was 
supported by probable cause. An officer has probable cause to arrest a 
person when the totality of the circumstances supports the reasonable 
-10-
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inference that a person is committing a crime. Here, probable cause was 
established by the information Loken received from Raines, Loken's own 
observations, Defendant's furtive movements, his attempts to conceal and 
destroy the evidence, and his demand that the driver take off. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
BOTH DEFENDANT'S DETENTION AND HIS ARREST WERE 
REASONABLE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Defendant argues that his detention and arrest violated the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Br. Aplt. 11. Specifically, 
Defendant claims that (1) the trial court based its decision to deny his 
motion "on four clearly erroneous findings of fact"; and (2) "Loken lacked 
reasonable suspicion" to detain Defendant and lacked probable cause to 
arrest him. Br. Aplt. 11, 16, 22. These claims lack merit. 
A. The trial court's findings were sufficiently supported by the 
evidence. 
Defendant argues that the trial court made the following four clearly 
erroneous findings when it denied his suppression motion: (1) that the Geo 
was backed into the parking spot for a "quick get-away"; (2) that Raines 
believed a drug transaction was occurring "based on his experience"; (3) 
that Loken' s first words to Defendant were "don't move" rather than 
"Police, don't move"; and (4) that Defendant "reached for the gearshift and 
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told the driver to 'take off' and 'just drive"' before "Loken went into the car 
to restrain" Defendant "and effect an arrest." Br. Aplt. 11, 15. The court's 
findings and analysis are supported by the evidence and reasonable 
inferences from that evidence. 
A trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. This Court 
will reverse a trial court's findings only if they are not adequately supported 
by the record, "resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's determination." State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, -;f 25, 
108 P.3d 710 (quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-936 (Utah 1994); 
Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, i111 (trial court's factual findings reviewed for clear 
error). A trial court's findings are adequately supported when the record 
contains some evidence supporting them. See State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, i113, 
20 P.3d 300; accord State v. Cecil, 2012 UT App 280, if 5, 288 P.3d 22. When the 
trial court's findings include inferences drawn from the evidence, this Court 
does "not take issue with those inferences unless the logic . . . is so flawed" 
that the inference is "clearly erroneous." Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56, 
if18, 181 P.3d 791; see also State v. John, 586 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 1978) (trial 
court may consider "all of the facts affirmatively shown, as well as any 
unexplained areas, and draw whatever inferences may fairly and 
-12-
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reasonably be drawn therefrom in the light of their own experiences and 
judgment"). 
Defendant first challenges the trial court's finding that the Geo was 
backed into the parking spot for a "quick get-away." Br. Aplt. 11. 
Defendant does not challenge the finding that the Geo was backed into a 
parking space. Defendant only challenges that it was positioned for a quick 
get-away. Br. Aplt. 11. While Raines did not use the specific words II quick 
get-away," the trial court could have properly inferred from the evidence 
that the car was in fact positioned for a quick get-away. Raines testified that 
the Geo was back-end parked, on the side of the building, where employees 
park, not customers, and that Defendant was acting suspiciously. R284:4, 5, 
15, 29; R285:4. Worthington testified that the keys were in the ignition while 
the Geo was parked. R284:21. Given all this evidence, the trial court could 
reasonably infer that the Geo was positioned for a quick-getaway. See State 
v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993) (fact finders can make inferences 
reasonably and logically drawn from the evidence). 
Defendant next challenges the trial court's finding that "Raines told 
Loken and Worthington that he believed the balloons contained drugs and 
that a drug h·ansaction was occurring 'based on his experience."' Br. Aplt. 
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12, 15. Specifically, Defendant challenges the trial court's finding that 
Raines' knowledge was "based on his experience." Br. Aplt. 12. 
Raines expressly testified that he knew that a drug transaction was 
occurring based on his prior drug experience, which included a citation for 
marijuana paraphernalia, and from "watching TV, court TV, anything like 
that." R284:4-5. This evidence supports the trial court's finding that Raines' 
conclusion was based on his experience. See John, 586 P.2d at 412 (trial court 
is in the best position to decide what weight to give evidence and judge 
truthfulness of witnesses); see also Pena, 869 P.2d at 967 (trial judge in best 
position to assess witness credibility). 
Defendant argues next that the trial court erred by finding that Loken 
said only "don't move" when Defendant noticed him. Br. Aplt. 12-13, 15. 
Defendant argues that Loken said "Police, don't move." Id. 
The trial court's finding that Loken said "don't move," and not 
"Police, don't move," is based on Loken' s written statement and 
preliminary hearing testimony as well as Worthington's written statement. 
R174-175, 268:B (Worthington written statement). Loken wrote in his 
written statement that he said, "do not move," and at the preliminary 
hearing, he testified that he said "don't move and don't do anything 
stupid." R285:6. R174. And Worthington wrote in his written state1nent that 
-14-
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Loken said, "don't 1nove your hands." 268:B (Worthington written 
statement). 
Although Loken testified at the later evidentiary hearing that he said 
"Police don't move," the trial court found that this later testimony was not 
as reliable as Loken's earlier testimony and written statement. R174-175; see 
John, 586 P.2d at 412 (trial court is in the best position to decide what weight 
to give evidence and judge truthfulness of witnesses). Thus, the trial court's 
finding was properly supported by the evidence. See Clark, 2001 UT App 9, 
ljl13 (finding need be supported by "some evidence"). 
But even if the trial court's finding were erroneous, that does not 
undermine the trial court's ultimate ruling. The trial court concluded that 
Defendant was detained when Loken said "don't move." R185-188. The 
result would have been the same had Loken said, "Police, don't move." See 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (person is "seized" 
within the Fourth Amendment when "a reasonable person would have 
believed that he was not free to leave."). 
Last, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by finding that he 
"reached for the gearshift and told the driver to 'take off' and 'just drive' 
before "Loken went into the car to restrain" Defendant. Br. Aplt. 13. The 
crux of Defendant's challenge is that the trial court misstated the timing of 
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the events. Br. Aplt. 13. Defendant does not challenge that he reached for 
the gearshift and told the drive to "just drive"; he challenges only that this 
occurred before Loken restrained him. Br. Aplt. 13. 
The court's finding is supported by Worthington's evidentiary 
hearing testimony. R284:16. At the evidentiary hearing, Worthington 
testified that he saw Defendant shove the towel to the car floor, "start[] 
yelling to the driver to take off," and "reach[] for the gearshift." R284:16. He 
then saw Loken "basically halfway in the car" attempting to restrain 
Defendant. R284:16. Worthington's testimony supports the trial court's 
finding. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 113 (holding that trial court's finding need only be 
supported by some evidence). 
In sum, the evidence considered by the trial court was more than 
sufficient to support the trial court's challenged findings of fact. 
B. Defendant's detention and arrest were reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Defendant next argues that his initial detention and ensuing arrest 
were unreasonable Fourth Amendment seizures. The trial court correctly 
concluded otherwise. 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. See U.S. Const. Amend. IV. "The touchstone" of a court's analysis 
under the Fourth Amendment "is always 'the reasonableness in all the 
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circu1nstances of the particular government invasion of a citizen's personal 
security."' Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (quoting Tern; 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). Reasonableness "depends 'on a balance 
between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security 
free fr01n arbitrary interference by law officers."' State v. Warren, 2003 UT 
36, ,I25, 78 P.3d 590 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 
878 (1975)). "The Fourth Amendment is not ... a guarantee against all 
searches and seizures, but only against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985). 
Under the Fourth Amendment, there are three levels of 
constitutionally permissible encounters between police officers and the 
public: (1) consensual encounters, (2) investigatory stops, and (3) arrests. 
This case involves the latter two. 
A level two encounter involves an officer's brief and non-intrusive 
investigative detention of a person. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ,135, 63 
P.3d 650. A level two encounter is a seizure within the Fourth Amendment 
and must be justified by reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person 
has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. See State v. 
Markland, 2005 UT 26, ,IlO, 112 P.3d 507. While such detentions may not be 
based on "inarticulate hunches," an officer is under no obligation to rule out 
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innocent conduct before initiating a stop. Id. at if17 (citing United States v. 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)); see also State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, if 23, 
164 P.3d 397. Simply put, there need only be articulable facts from which an 
officer can reasonably infer that criminal activity "may be afoot." See Terry, 
392 U.S. at 30. 
A level three encounter is an arrest, which must be supported by 
probable cause that a defendant has committed or is committing a crime. 
State v. Dietman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-618 (Utah 1987). Like reasonable 
suspicion, probable cause is an "objective standard," based on the totality of 
the circumstances at the time of the seizure. State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 
226 (UT App 1995). To determine whether an officer had probable cause, 
this Court examines "the events leading up to the arrest," and "then 
decide[s] 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an 
objectively reasonable police officer, amount to' probable cause." Maryland 
v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). 
1. Defendant's detention was supported by reasonable 
suspicion. 
Defendant argues that his initial detention was not supported by 
reasonable suspicion. Br. Aplt. 17. He claims that Loken did not have 
reasonable suspicion to detain him because Raines' tip was umeliable and 
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insufficiently detailed, and because Loken' s observations alone could not 
support the detention. Br. Aplt. 17-18, 21. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
As stated, it is well-established Fourth Amendment law that an officer 
may briefly detain an individual when he has reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that criminal activity "may be afoot." Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. The 
reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a detention is "dependent upon 
both the content of the information possessed by police and its degree of 
reliability." Narvarette v. California, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (quoting 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). That said, "reasonable suspicion 
can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show 
probable cause." White, 496 U.S. at 330. In evaluating whether reasonable 
suspicion existed, courts examine the specific and articulable facts 
supporting an officer's reasonable suspicion in their totality, rather than 
looking at each fact in isolation. Markland, 2005 UT 26, ,I19; Worwood, 2007 
UT 47, ,I23; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983) (adopting 
"totality-of-the-circumstances" approach to determining informant 
reliability in place of a rigid, separate-elements test). "It is imperative that 
the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available 
to the officer at the moment of the seizure" "warrant a man of reasonable 
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caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?" Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 21-22 (quotations omitted). 
It is well established that officers can develop reasonable suspicion 
based on an informant's tip. See Narvarette, 134 S.Ct. at 1691-92 (anonymous 
911 caller's tip, under totality of the circumstances test, had indicia of 
reliability to provide officer with reasonable suspicion); State v. Roybal, 2010 
UT 34, 'if 'if14-20, 232 P.3d 1016 (identified 911 caller's tip sufficient to 
provide reasonable suspicion to effectuate traffic stop). To determine 
whether an informant's tip has the indicia of reliability to provide an officer 
with reasonable suspicion, the reliability of the tip and the veracity of the 
caller are examined as part of the totality of the circumstances. See 
Narvarette, 134 S.Ct. at 1687-1689 (United States Supreme Court examined 
reliability and veracity of tip information); see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 
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(abandoning rigid legal test in favor of totality of circu1nstances test as 
"rigid legal rules are ill-suited").2 
When evaluating an informant's tip, "reliability and veracity are 
generally assumed" if the tip comes from a citizen who receives nothing 
from police in exchange for the information. State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, 
if18, 48 P.3d 872; see also Roybal, 2010 UT 34, if19 (recognizing "identified 
citizen-informant is presumed reliable"). An "ordinary citizen-informant 
needs no independent proof of reliability or veracity," and therefore, courts 
instead "simply assume veracity when a citizen-informant provides 
information as a victim or witness of a crime." State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 
219, i122, 51 P.3d 55 (quotations and citation omitted). This is because an 
identified citizen's reputation can be assessed and the identified citizen "can 
be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated." J.L., 529 U.S. 
2 To the extent that this Court relies on the three-part citizen 
informant test set forth in State v. Prows, 2007 UT App 409, ,r,r14-19, 178 
P.3d 908, a tip's reliability should be analyzed under the standard set forth 
by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 
(1983). In Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, the United States Supreme Court adopted a 
totality of the circumstances approach for analyzing whether reasonable 
suspicion exists, abandoning the use of rigid analysis. The United States 
Supreme Court uses the totality of the circu1nstances approach for 
analyzing whether a tip provides the indicia of reliability to support 
reasonable suspicion. See Navarrette, 134 S. Ct. at 1688-1689; White, 496 U.S. 
at 331-32; Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271-72 (2000); Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 
690, 695-96 (1996). 
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at 270. Identified citizen informants are "high on the reliability scale and are 
entitled to a presumption of veracity." State v. Keener, 2008 UT App 288, i-f10, 
191 P.3d 835; Roybal, 2010 UT 34, ,1,116-19 (same); see also Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 3.4(a) (2007) 
(concluding that corroboration is "unnecessary when the reports of one who 
appears to be an average citizen are made upon his personal observation of 
the commission of a crime.") ( quotations and citation omitted). 
Here, Raines' report of ongoing drug activity gave Loken reasonable 
suspicion to detain Defendant. First, because Raines was a concerned and 
identified citizen informant, his report was highly reliable. See Roybal, 2010 
UT 34, ~i116-19; Norris, 2001 UT 104, if18; Keener, 2008 UT App 288, ,I10. 
And second, nothing Loken observed served to dispel Raines' report. See 
Roybal, 2010 UT 34, ,r21 (recognizing officer responded to DUI report is 
entitled to rely on report "unless the officer's personal observations or 
interaction with the suspect present indications to the contrary"). 
Indeed, the reliability and veracity of Raines' report was buttressed 
by its detail, timing, and Loken's corroboration. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 234 
(informant's "explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, 
along with a statement that the event was observed first hand entitles the 
tip to greater weight"); Narvarette, 134 S.Ct. at 1689 (911 caller's reliable tip 
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created reasonable suspicion where tip contemporaneous with event, caller 
had eye-witness knowledge); White, 496 U.S. at 331-32 (officer corroboration 
of innocent details made anonymous tip sufficiently reliable to create 
reasonable suspicion). 
Raines informed Loken, only minutes after seeing Defendant, that a 
drug deal was occurring in the parking lot. R286:6, 15, 29; see also Narvarette, 
134 S.Ct. at 1689 (" contemporaneous report has long been treated as 
especially reliable"). Raines provided Loken with the location of the car, a 
detailed description of the car, and a description of how the car was parked. 
R284:6. Raines also described the occupants of the car, that the passenger-
Defendant-was acting suspicious, had a towel with "a bunch of pink 
balloons" on his lap, and that Defendant was manipulating them. R284:4. 
And Loken verified Raines' tip. Loken found the car, Defendant, and 
the towel exactly as Raines described. See Kaysville CihJ v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 
231, 237 (UT App 1997); accord see Salt Lake City v. Stre~t, 2011 UT .App 111, 
Gjf 15, 251 P.3d 862 ( officer corroborated tip by "either observing the illegal 
activity or by finding person, vehicle, and the location substantially" as 
described by informant). It is immaterial that Loken did not see the 
balloons where every other detail provided by Raines was verified. See 
White, 496 U.S. at 331 ( officer corroboration of innocent details made tip 
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reliable). In fact, all of Loken' s observations supported Raines' tip, further 
supporting the tip's veracity. See Roybal, 2010 UT 34, ~21 (recognizing 
officer entitled to rely on tip "unless the officer's personal observations or 
interactions with the suspect present indications to the contrary"). 
The reliability and veracity of Raines tip alone created reasonable 
suspicion. See Roybal, 2010 UT 34, ~~14 n.2, 20-21; Street, 2011 UT App 111, 
~9, 251 P.3d. And Loken's own observations added to that suspicion. 
Therefore, applying the totality of the circumstances test, the objective facts 
confronting Loken at the time of the detention reasonably suggested that 
criminal activity involving Defendant "may be afoot," and thus Loken had 
reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
Defendant nevertheless argues that reasonable suspicion did not exist 
because Raines did not have "any knowledge" to associate the balloons 
with drugs and no evidence supported that "Loken knew-from training or 
experience or otherwise-that balloons or towels [were] indicative of 
criminal activity." Br. Aplt. 18-19. Defendant argues that such knowledge is 
not common to members of the public. Br. Aplt. 18. 
But as stated, Raines' testified that he believed a drug transaction was 
occurring based on his experience- a previous citation for marijuana 
paraphernalia-and from "watching TV, court TV, anything like that." 
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R284:4. And Defendant failed to show that Raines' past drug history and 
knowledge fro1n popular culture is not enough to support that he knew that 
he was witnessing a drug h·ansaction. See e.g., State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030, 
1032 (UT App 1994) (informant report of cocaine and marijuana was 
adequate basis for search warrant, where tip was detailed and informant 
was knowledgeable because of prior marijuana use). Indeed, knowledge of 
heroin is permeating popular culture, as it is often in the news and depicted 
on T.V. shows. See Debbie Dujanovic, Utah Countt; Sees Alarming Spike in 
Heroin Use, Police Say, KSL.com (aired April 28, 2014), 
https:/ /www.ksl.com/?sid=29679407&nid=1171 (heroin packaged for sale 
in balloons; heroin balloons hidden in drug sellers' mouths); Bob Mims and 
Erin Alberty, Major Heroin Ring Busted in Salt Lake, Utah Counties, Salt Lake 
Tribune (May 14, 2014), http:/ /www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/57938752-
78/utah-lake-salt heroin.html.esp (balloons used to package and transport 
heroin); Utah Lawmaker evaluating needs of SLC homeless witnesses assault cops 
seize heroin crack and cash, Fox13, (aired May 28, 2015) 
http:/ /fox13now.com/2015/05/29/utah-lawmaker-evaluating-needs-of-
slcs-homeless-wi tnesses-assa ult-cops-seize-heroin-crack-and-cash/ (390 
heroin balloons confiscated); Ashton Edwards and Danica Lawrence, 
$800,000 drug bust nets heroin, meth, live grenades in Midvale, Fox13, (aired 
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September 8, 2015), http:/ /fox13now.com/2015/09/08/401119/; Bob 
Mims, Cops Seize $1M in Heroin from Suspected Mexican Cartel Operation, Salt 
Lake Tribune (September 3, 2015), http:/ /www.sltrib.com/news/2908704-
155/utah-cops-seize-lm-in-heroin. Because heroin is part of the main-
stream popular culture, it is reasonable to assume that both a lay-person 
and an officer would know that it is trafficked in balloons and would be 
able to identify that the circumstances here involved a drug deal. 
Moreover, even though Loken did not specifically testify about his 
training and experience with drugs, he is a 24 year veteran with the 
Division of Wildlife Resources. As such he is a certified peace officer who 
completed POST training. See Utah Code Ann. § 53-13-103(b)(iii) (West 
2015) (law enforcement officer includes Division of Wildlife Resources 
conservation officer); Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-1.5 (West 2015) (Division of 
Wildlife Resources conservation officers have same powers as other law 
enforcement officers); Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-205 (West 2015) (law 
enforcement officers must complete POST training); State v. Skousen, 2012 
UT App 325, iflO, 290 P.3d 919 (Division of Wildlife Resources conservation 
officer "is necessarily a full-time, permanent employee of the Division of 
Wildlife Resources who is POST certified as a peace or a special function 
officer.") ( quotation omitted). The trial court could reasonably infer, 
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therefore, that Loken reasonably suspected that criminal activity may be 
afoot, and that drugs were involved because of the totality of the 
circumstances and his veteran status as a peace officer. See Workman, 852 
P.2d at 985 (fact finders can 1nake inferences reasonably and logically drawn 
from the evidence). 
Thus, reasonable suspicion supported Defendant's detention. 
2. Defendant's arrest is supported by probable cause. 
Defendant argues that he was arrested when Loken "attempted to 
restrain" his "hands and told him [that] he was under arrest." Br. Aplt. 23. 
Defendant argues that Raines' tip, Loken' s observations, and his furtive 
movements of shoving the towel to the floor when Loken approached do 
not support probable cause for his arrest. Br. Aplt. 23-24. Defendant's claim 
is meritless. 
a. Defendant was not arrested until Loken restrained him. 
An arrest occurs when there is "an actual restraint of the person 
arrested or submission to custody." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-1 (West 2014). 
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "An arrest requires 
either physical force or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of 
authority." California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). An officer saying 
"Stop, in the name of the law!" does "not remotely" meet the requirements 
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for an arrest. Id. A person is arrested when there is the "application of 
physical force to restrain movement, even when • it is ultimately 
unsuccessful[]." Id. 
Here, Defendant was not arrested until Loken actually restrained him 
and said that "you are under arrest."R285:14. Prior to that moment, 
Defendant was only detained. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626. Loken seized 
Defendant after Defendant shoved the towel and drugs to the floor, 
screamed at the driver to "just drive," and reached for the gearshift. 
R284:16, 21; R285:6-8. Immediately after those events, Loken told Defendant, 
"you are under arrest," and actually restrained Defendant's hands. R285:14; 
284:33. That is the moment of arrest, and not before. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. 
at 626. 
b. Defendant's arrest was supported by probable cause. 
A warrantless arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
"where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or 
is being committed." State v. Hansen, 2011 UT App 242, ,rs, 262 P.3d 448; 
accord State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, if 26, 57 P.3d 1052. Probable cause is "an 
objective standard" where an officer's subjective beliefs "neither constitute 
probable cause nor foreclose a finding of probable cause." Spurgeon, 904 
P.2d at 226. To determine whether probable cause exists, this Court makes a 
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"practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances" 
confronting the officer, there was "a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime [would] be found in a particular place." Gates, 462 U.S. 
at 238. In other words, "probable cause does not require more than a 
rationally based conclusion of probability." State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 
1088 (Utah 1986); accord State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531,534 (Utah 1994). 
The probable cause requirement is satisfied as long as there exists a 
reasonable inference that supports a conclusion that the defendant probably 
committed the crime, even if there are equally strong inferences to the 
contrary. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, ,I20 (holding that inference of legitimate 
behavior "does not negate the reasonable inference" of criminal conduct). 
Determining whether probable cause exists depends on an examination of 
all the information available to the officer, including an informant's tip and 
the officer's own observations. See State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1233 
(Utah 1996) (must examine "totality of the circumstances," including the 
informants' tips, together with police observations, to see whether probable 
cause existed to arrest defendant). 
Here, Loken had probable cause to arrest Defendant. Loken' s 
probable cause determination was based on Raines' tip, his own 
observations and Defendant's attempt to conceal the evidence and flee. 
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R285:12-14; see Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-31 (probable cause determined by 
examining totality of circumstances); see also Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1233 
(must examine "totality of the circumstances" for probable cause 
determination). When Loken told Defendant "don't move," Defendant's 
reaction was to shove the towel and its contents- heroin-filled balloons - to 
the floor of the car, tell the driver to "just drive," and reach for the gearshift. 
R284:10-11, 21; R285:l l, 16. Moreover, throughout the entire, incredibly 
short episode, Defendant struggled and resisted arrest. R285:14; R284:16-17, 
33-35. 
Given the totality of the evidence, Loken' s decision to arrest was 
supported by probable cause that: (1) Defendant interfered with an 
arresting officer; and (2) there was "a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime" would be in the car. Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-305 (West 
2014) (interference with an arresting officer); see Trane, 2002 UT 97, ifif30-36 
( officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for interference with an 
arresting officer when defendant physically struggled against officers and 
refused to c01nply with orders.) 
A person is guilty of the class B misdemeanor interfering with an 
arresting officer when that person has "knowledge" or "should have 
knowledge," that a peace officer "is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or 
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detention" and that person "interferes with the arrest or detention by" either 
using force or refusing "to perform any act required by lawful order" that is 
"necessary to effect the arrest or detention." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305(2) 
( emphasis added). 
Here, Defendant actively disobeyed Loken' s order not to move and 
immediately h·ied to conceal evidence. R285:11. At minimum, therefore, 
Defendant was interfering with a lawful detention. These actions alone 
constitute interference with an arresting officer and provide probable cause 
for arrest. See Utah Code Ann.§ 76-8-305; see also Trane, 2002 UT 97, ifil30-36 
(defendant knew that officers were police officers conducting official police 
business, and defendant thus had no right to physically resist officer's order 
to submit to a search). And even after Loken resh·ained Defendant, 
Defendant continued to resist and tried to destroy the evidence - by h·ying 
to eat a balloon. These facts provided Loken further probable cause to 
arrest. 
Defendant's arrest is also supported by the facts suggesting that he 
was dealing in contraband. See State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, if23, 147 P.3d 
425 (concealing evidence probable cause for arrest); see also Trane, 2002 UT 
97, if28 (officer has probable cause whenever the crin1e is committed in the 
presence). Loken testified he believed that Defendant was "trying to hide or 
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get rid of" conh·aband because of his furtive n1ove1nents and Raines' tip. 
R285:13. And although Defendant claims Loken could not rely on 
Defendant's furtive movements, the law is well settled that furtive 
movements when coupled with other facts support probable cause. See 
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67 (1968) ("[D]eliberately furtive actions 
and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of 
mens rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the 
officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors 
to be considered in the decision to make an arrest."); see also United States v. 
McGehee, 672 F.3d 860, 870 (10th Cir. 2012) ( officer had probable cause to 
arrest defendant during traffic stop after observing defendant kick gun 
underneath seat and smelling PCP emitting from car); State v. Holmes, 774 
P.2d 506, 511 (UT App. 1989) (acts of concealment or furtive movement are 
relevant in establishing probable cause); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 3.6(d) (5th ed.) ("Observation of what reasonably appear to be 
furtive gestutes is a factor which may properly be taken into account in 
determining whether probable cause exists."). The totality of the 
circumstances establish probable cause: Raines' tip, Loken' s observations, 
Defendant's immediate attempt to conceal the towel and its contents, 
Defendant's frantic reaction to Loken-yelling at the driver to "just drive" 
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and reaching for the gearshift. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-31 (totality of 
circumstances establish probable cause); Spurgeon, 904 P.2d at 226 (whether 
probable cause exists requires common sense assessment of the totality of 
the circumstances confronting arresting officer). Indeed, where Defendant 
was openly and actively engaging in criminal activity in a public place, 
Loken' s only option as a peace officer was to arrest him. See State v. Folkes, 
565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977) (When officer observes suspicious activity, 
"he has not only the right but the duty to make observations and 
investigations" to determine if law is violated; and if so, to take such 
necessary measures to enforce the law.). 
Additionally, Loken's actions were justified under the exigent 
circumstances exception. Exigent circumstances are "those that would cause 
a reasonable person to believe that [an immediate search or seizure] ... was 
necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the 
destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other 
consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts." 
State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 18 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting United States v. 
McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir.) (1984). Exigency "does not evolve 
from one individual fact," but from the "totality of the facts and 
circumstances." State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). 
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In this case, Loken' s resh"aint of Defendant was necessary to prevent 
not only the possible loss of evidence, but also Defendant from fleeing. See 
Alverez, 2006 UT 61, ~37 (reasonable search where officers prevented 
defendant from eating balloon filled with drugs). As soon as Defendant saw 
Loken and Loken told him "don't 1nove," Defendant tried to conceal the 
evidence, and to flee. R285:11; 284:16. These events occurred quickly. Loken, 
as the lone officer at the scene, faced a choice of acting immediately to 
protect the evidence and enforcing the law or allowing Defendant to leave. 
Loken did not have time to call for back-up, set-up a perimeter, or 
investigate further. See Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1260 (exigent circumstances existed 
for search and arrest where officers had no advance information about drug 
buy or defendant, saw defendant, and could not protect against defendant's 
escape); Folkes, 565 P.2d at 1127 (officer has duty to enforce law). Indeed, 
Loken' s only option was to seize Defendant to prevent the destruction of 
evidence and flight of Defendant. See Alverez, 2006 UT 61, ~36 (officers not 
required to allow defendant to swallow drugs). Thus, Loken was also 
justified in seizing Defendant to prevent him from fleeing or concealing the 
drugs. 
In arguing to the contrary, Defendant asserts that his case is just like 
State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), State v. Parke, 2009 UT App 50, 
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205 P.3d 104, and State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506 (UT App. 1989). Br. Aplt. 26 
But none of these cases address the situation here, where Defendant was 
conducting a drug transaction in a public place as a passenger in a parked 
car and was discovered by a reliable citizen-informant whose tip was 
confirmed by the arresting officer. See State v. Martinez, 2008 UT App 90, 12 
182 P.3d 385 (search and seizure cases are fact-dependent). 
In Schossler, the evidence was suppressed because the officer, 
following a tr~ffic stop, based his search of the car solely on the passenger's 
behavior of "bending forward, activing fidgety, turning to the left and to the 
right," then looking at the officer. 774 P.2d at 1134. In Parke, the defendant's 
"somewhat agitated" reaction to the officer's request during a traffic stop 
did not, by itself, support probable cause. 2009 UT App 50, ,rs. And in 
Holmes, the defendant's attempt to stuff a roll of paper towels in between 
the car seats during a tTaffic stop did not, by itself, establish probable cause. 
774 P.2d 506. As discussed, there was much more here. 
Unlike these cases, Defendant was not stopped for a traffic violation. 
Rather, Defendant was parked in a public place conducting a drug deal, and 
upon being surprised by Loken, actively shoved the towel and its contents 
to the floor. Thus, Loken did not rely solely on glances or arguably innocent 
movements, as did the officers in Schosslet, Parlee, and Holmes. Rather, Loken 
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relied on all the evidence to support probable cause: Raines tip, Raines' 
statement that Defendant was conducting a drug transaction, his own 
observations, and Defendant's furtive motions. See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 65 
(probable cause to arrest 1nay be based on deliberately furtive actions 
coupled with officer's specific knowledge.). Thus, Schossler, Parke and Holmes 
are inapplicable. 
Finally, Defendant argues that this Court's fooh1ote in State v. 
Martinez supports his argument. Br. Aplt 25. In Martinez, footnote 3 states 
that the defendant's and passenger's behavior of looking like they were 
putting something on a car floor as the officer effectuated a traffic stop 
"does not establish reasonable, articulable suspicion." 2008 UT App 90, if 2 
n.3. But this Court upheld the search and detention in Martinez, because just 
like Defendant's case here, the totality of the circumstances supported the 
officer's actions. Id. at if 28. 
In sum, the totality of the evidence supports the trial court's ruling 
that Defendant's detention was supported by reasonable suspicion and that 
his ensuing seizure- either to arrest or to prevent escape and desh·uction of 
evidence-was supported by probable cause. The trial court, therefore, did 
not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on September 28, 2015. 
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U.S. Constitutional Amendment IV. Search and Seizure 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
§ 76-8-305.5. Failure to stop at the command of a law enforcement officer 
A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor who flees from or otherwise attempts to 
elude a law enforcement officer: 
(1) after the officer has issued a verbal or visual command to stop; 
(2) for the purpose of avoiding arrest; and 
(3) by any means other than a violation of Section 41-6a-210 regarding failure to stop a 
vehicle at the c01mnand of a law enforcement officer. 
§ 58-37-8. Prohibited acts--Penalties 
(1) Prohibited acts A--Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionallv: 
., 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, 
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange 
to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation 
of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert 
with five or more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of 
organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (1)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a conh·olled 
substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a 
second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first 
degree felony; 
(ii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or 
marijuana, or a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty of a third degree felony, 
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or. 
(iii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule Vis guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may 
be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the 
h·ier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or 
possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during the commission or in 
furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for 
a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may 
additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree 
felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven 
years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be 
suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B--Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance 
analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or 
order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of the person's professional 
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control o.f any building, room, 
tenement, vehicle, boat aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit 
them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled 
substances in any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged 
prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convi~ted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 
ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third 
degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of 
the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a person1s conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a 
conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree 
greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
( d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled 
substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including a substance listed 
in Section 58-37-4.2, or less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, 
and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior 
boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-
1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one 
degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect 
to controlled substances as listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indetenninate 
term as provided by law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year to 
run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)( d), the person may be sentenced to imprisom11ent for an 
indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the 
person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
C, 
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(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not 
amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in the person's 
body any measurable amount of a conh·olled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, 
causing serious bodily injury as defined inSection 76-1-601 or the death of another. 
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in the person1s body: 
(i) a conh·olled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in 
Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a conh·olled substance classified under Schedule II is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 58-37-4 
(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA), or a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty of a third degree 
felony; or 
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or Vis guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor. 
(i) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering serious bodily injury 
or death as a result of the person's negligent driving in violation of Subsection 58-37-
8 (2)(g) whether or not the injuries arise from the same episode of driving. 
(3) Prohibited acts C--Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a 
license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, 
for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent 
oneself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, 
or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the 
administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person 
known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the 
administration o.f any controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the 
person to disclose receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, 
forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, 
or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under 
the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed 
to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, 
imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or 
container or labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit conh·olled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D--Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this 
chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, 
Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation 
Conh·olled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications 
under this Subsection ( 4) if the trier of fact finds the act is conm1itted: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of 
those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the 
grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other sh·ucture or grounds 
which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or tlu·ough a 
school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, 
or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library; 
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds 
included in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii); 
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act 
occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or . 
distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of 
any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3. 
(b)(i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and 
shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that ,,vould 
otherwise have been established but for this Subsection (4) would have been a first 
degree felony. 
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less 
than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this 
Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for 
that offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g). 
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
• 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting with 
the mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly solicits, 
requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to 
commit a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly 
believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was 
unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the 
location where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was 
unaware that the location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(6) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections (1)(b) and (2)(c), a plea of 
guilty or no contest to a violation of this section which is held in abeyance under Title 
77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, even if the charge 
has been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance with the plea in abeyance 
agreement. 
(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section, 
notwithstanding a charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this 
chapter. 
(8)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu 
of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state, 
conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a 
bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a 
person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, dish·ibuted, or dispensed a 
conh·olled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons 
did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or substances. 
(10) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of the 
veterinarian's professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be 
administered by an assistant or orderly under the veterinarian's direction and 
supervision. 
(11) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or 
possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new 
drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or 
research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of the officer's 
employment. 
(12)(a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian, 
as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(1)(v), who uses, possesses, or transports peyote .for 
bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a 
traditional Indian religion as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(1)(w). 
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as defined in 
Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the peyote was used, 
possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in 
connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion. 
(c)(i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative 
defense under this Subsection (12) as soon as practicable, but not later than 10 days 
prior to trial. 
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense. 
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for good cause 
shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice. 
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection (12) by a 
preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a complete defense to 
the charges. 
(13)(a) It is an affirmative defense that the person produced, possessed, or administered 
a conh·olled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 if the person: 
(i) was engaged in medical research; and 
(ii) was a holder of a valid license to possess controlled substances under Section 58-37-
6. 
(b) It is not a defense under Subsection (13)(a) that the person prescribed or dispensed a 
controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2. 
(14) It is an affirmative defense that the person possessed, in the person's body, a 
controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 if: 
(a) the person was the subject of medical research conducted by a holder of a valid 
license to possess controlled substances under Section 58-37-6; and 
(b) the substance was administered to the person by the medical researcher. 
(15) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or 
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect 
without the invalid provision or application. 
(16) A legislative body of a political subdivision may not enact an ordinance that is less 
restrictive than any provision of this chapter. 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
RULING 
Case No. 131401457 
Judge CHARLENE BARLOW 
This matter came before the Court for oral argument on June 24, 2014, on defendant's 
motion to suppress for unconstitutional search and seizure. The state was represented by 
William J. Carlson; defendant was represented by Heather Chestnut. The Court heard 
argument, took the matter under advisement and set a scheduling conference for July 10, 2014, 
which was rescheduled for July 21,_2.(114.._AUbas ... cb ... e.d.uling_confe.r:ence ... _onJuly.21,---2014-,-th~e'---------
Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress for unconstitutional search and seizure and 
stated that a written ruling would follow. The Court having reviewed the pleadings, other 
documents, and arguments hereby enters a written ruling. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendant was charged with one count of possession or use of a controlled substance, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code § 58-37-8(2)(A){I), and one count of interference 
with arresting officer, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code § 76-8-305, on 
November 14, 2013 relating to an incident that occurred on September 19, 2013. In support of 
the charges, the state's evidence includes a pink balloon, the contents of which field tested 
positive for heroin. 
On May 23, 2014, defendant filed a motion to suppress the pink balloon and field test 
results based upon the exclusionary rule arguing the pink balloon was obtained as the result of 
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an unlawful search and seizure and therefore is fruit of the poisonous tree that should be 
exciuded. 
On June 6, 2014, the state filed a memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion to 
suppress. 
On June 23, 2014, defendant filed his reply memorandum to state's opposition to 
defendant's motion to suppress. 
Oral arguments were heard on June 24, 2014, and the Court took the matter under 
advisement. 
On July 10, 2014, defendant failed to appear and the Court informed the parties she was 
taking additional time to issue her decision. 
On July 21, 2014, the rescheduled hearing was held where the court announced its 
decision and stated written findings and conclusions would be entered. The following findings 
offact and conclusions of law reflect the basis of the Court's decision to deny defendant's 
motion to suppress for unconstitutional search and seizure. 
BASIS FOR THE FINDINGS OF FACT 
The findings of fact are based upon: {1) three handwritten witness statements dated 
September 19, 2013, (2) February 11, 2014, Preliminary Hearing transcript ("PH"), and (3) April 
3, 201-4,-n-identia-ryitearing-transcript-('"EH"J:---Thewrittenwi-rness statements of Raymond 
Loken ("Officer Loken"), Walter Mark Raines ("Mr. Raines"), Craig Worthington, ("Mr. 
Worthington") were submitted as exhibits at the evidentiary hearing. Transcripts of both 
hearings were filed with Defendant's initial Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress for 
Unconstitutional Search and Seizure. The preliminary hearing includes the testimony of Officer 
Loken and Officer Dustin Willie ("Officer Willie").1 The evidentiary hearing includes the 
testimony of Mr. Raines, Mr. Worthington, and Officer Loken. 
1 The Court notes the State argued in its brief that the preliminary hearing "is not helpful to this 
court because: 1- it was before a different judge, 2- its transcript was not admitted into 
evidence, and 3- the issue at preliminary hearings is only whether there is 'evidence sufficient 
to support a reasonable belief that the defendant committed the charged crime.111 The Court is 
not persuaded by the State's arguments. Preliminary hearings are part of the record and 
transcripts of those hearings are routinely used as a basis of facts when deciding pre-trial 
motions such as the present motion to suppress. 
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For the most part, Officer Loken's written statement and testimony at the hearings are 
consistent. At the evidentiary hearing, the Court found Officer Loken responsive and credible, 
and his testimony reliable. Although generally consistent, there are instances where Officer's 
Loken's written statement and testimony at the hearings differ. 
One example of when Officer Loken was different relates to what Mr. Raines told him 
before he approached the car. Officer Loken's written statement stated Mr. Raines alerted him 
"that there were suspicious circumstances in a Green Chevy passenger car on the west side of 
the store." At the preliminary hearing, Officer Loken testified that he had asked Mr. Raines 
what he had observed and he told me he was getting ready to leave, he had 
walked out to his vehicle and in the course of going out passed by a car that was 
parked on the west side of the store. When he glanced in the car, it was 
occupied by 2 people and he said they were doing something that to him, 
appeared suspicious so he kinda stared um and then the male that was in the car 
looked at him and either gave him a look or said something to the effect of 'what 
are you lookin at.' And Mark just got in his car and drove around to the front of 
the store and at that point he parked in front and came inside to tell me what he 
had just seen. PH 3-4. 
-----Mt-the-evident-iary-h-eafiflg,0f-fieer-1:ok-en-t-es-tif1ed.._, ---------------------
Uh Mark said he had been going out to his vehicle which was parked along the 
west side of the building and as he approached his vehicle he had passed this ... 
a green passenger car and um he said he just glanced into the passenger side of 
the ... of the vehicle and whoever was there he said ... he said they gave him a 
... a 'what are you lookin at kind of look,' which he said caught his attention. So 
as he got around to get in his vehicle he was able to look through the driver's 
window to the entire front compartment of the passenger car and he said the 
guy had a towel across his lap and he was fiddling with something that looked 
like balloons on his lap .... he thought that it was a drug transaction that was 
going on. EH 27-28. 
On cross examination at the evidentiary hearing, the following colloquy occurred: 
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Defense Counsel: Now it's true wasn't it that nobody mentioned balloons to you 
[before you approached the car] did they? 
Officer Loken: Um if ... if he did that's the part I don't really recall, I just know he 
said that he had things in his lap that .... and a towel across his 
Defense Counsel: 
Officer Loken: 
lap, he might've said that to Craig .... I might .... but I don't ... 
. he didn't specifically look at me and tell me that, so. 
About balloons you mean? 
Yes. 
Defense Counsel: Kay. So your just general information was maybe ... suspicious, 
maybe there's a drug deal? 
Officer Loken: Yes. 
EH 35. 
The brevity of Officer Loken's handwritten statement is not surprising because it is more work 
to write about an event than to talk about it. The Court frequently receives evidence of a brief 
written statement and then oral testimony that expands upon it. Although the statement is 
earlier in time and considered most reliable, the testimony does not "conflict" with the written 
statement as much as it expands upon it. Officer Loken's testimony at the hearings is generally 
-----b1onsiste-At.-T-he-dfff-er-en€e-in-Gf.fieer-b0ken~-t-estimony-rel-ates-t0-the-addition-th-at-Mr-;-R-aines 
told Officer Loken he saw balloons in defendant's lap and that he thought it was a drug 
transaction. Although this recitation of what Mr. Raines told him is different than Officer 
Loken's preliminary hearing testimony and cross examination testimony at the evidentiary 
hearing, it is supported by Mr. Raines and Mr. Worthington. 
Mr. Raines's handwritten statement recited that he told Mr. Worthington there was an 
illegal transaction going on in the parking lot. Mr. Raines also stated: 
[Mr. Worthington] and [Officer Loken] came out and I informed them where the 
car was and went to park my vehicle. I was then radioed over to help. When I 
approached I saw both [Officer Loken] and [Mr. Worthington] trying to detain 
the suspect. He was screaming, 'Eat it, Eat it.' I saw him trying to put pink 
balloons into his mouth. 
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. At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Raines testified that he said to Officer Loken and Mr. 
Worthington, "I said to 'em I was like yeah they're just over there and he's got .... right on his 
lap he's got a bunch of pink balloons going right here." EH 5. On cross examination, 
defendant's counsel asked him about not mentioning he saw the pink balloons earlier in his 
written statement and Mr. Raines responded, "Yes saying that he rearranged something as in 
he ... to me I ... he was kind of trying to hide it right at first but then I did see the balloons." 
EH 9. Mr. Raines admitted that he did not put that earlier in his written statement and when 
defense counsel asked why, he responded, "The only thing I can think of is that at that point I 
had already been about an hour and a half out ... out of work and dealing with this situation 
and uh I seemed to be little too brief. 11 EH 9. The Court finds Mr. Raines's testimony believable 
and explanation reasonable. 
Mr. Worthington's handwritten statement states thatat 5:20 p.m., he and Officer Loken 
were alerted by Mr. Raines that "a couple in a green car that looked very suspicious and had 
what appeared to be heroin on the passenger's lap." At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. 
Worthington testified that Mr. Raines told him and Officer Loken that "he [Mr. Raines] had seen 
a towel on the passenger's lap with some little pink balloons on it and that we needed to go out 
and probably take a look at it." EH 14. The Court finds Mr. Worthington's testimony credible. 
--------1A-summar-y,t-he-c-ertsist-ency-of-both-Mr;-Rainesnnd-Mr.-W-orthirrgto11-'rte-stiTI'fCffi 
leads the Court to believe that Officer Loken's testimony that Mr. Raines told him and Mr. 
Worthington that defendant had balloons and suspected a drug transaction is true and that his 
failure to include it in the written report and inability to recall that fact during cross 
examination at the evidentiary hearing does not change the fact that Mr. Raines told him and 
Mr. Worthington that defendant had balloons and suspected a drug transaction. 
Another example of Officer Loken's differing statements relates to what he said when 
the car occupants noticed him. Officer Loken's written statement states that when he 
approached the car and was noticed by the occupants: "Figuring drugs I [said] to both persons 
in the car to 'do not move.' [Defendant] drove his hands and towel to the floor as I said 'Police, 
You are under arrest."' Officer Loken's testimony at the preliminary hearing was: 
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At that point um I. .. I told'em ... there was 2 things I said, one was 'don't move' 
and 'don't do anything stupid.' ... Well I could see the startled look on Mr. 
Hinmon's face and at that point he grabbed for whatever was in the center of 
the towel and I still hadn't seen it and shoved his hands towards the floor boards 
between his legs in the car. And at that point my thought was either A, he's 
hiding contraband or he's going for weapon. PH 5-6. 
Officer Loken's testimony at the evidentiary hearing was that when defendant noticed him: 
he got a real deer in the head lights look, big eye's, froze for a second. At that 
point I said 'police officer, don't move.' .... Well, after I said "police, don't 
move" um af ... there was just a momentary hesitation and then Mr. Hinman 
taking his hands were already down in his lap, grabbed whatever was there in a 
bunch and threw his hands towards the floor of the vehicle. . . . Well almost 
instantaneously 2 thoughts went through my mind, 1. He's trying to hide stuff, 
the other is he could be going for a weapon. EH 29-30. 
Mr. Worthington's written statement was: "Lokken stuck his head in and said 'don't 
move your hands' the suspect shoved his hands down into his lap [and] then down to the floor, 
Loken then stated 'your under arrest give me your hands."' At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. 
Worth i ngto n-testified:-1lt.Jm-and-as-we--waike-d-up-1-could-s-e-e"""2-in-d ividualnittinffinth-ec-cn-a-n-d· 
Officer Loken came· up kind of the back of the car kinda peeked in over the shoulder of the 
passenger and was looking down at what they were doin and said something like 'stop, put 
your hands down, police;' or 'police, put your hands down."' 
In summary, although there are differences, the testimony of both Officer Loken and 
·Mr. Worthington thaf Officer Loken first told the occupants, "Don't move," is both in their early 
written statements and their later testimony; thus, the Court finds that that statement was 
made. This event happened very quickly. The Court understands that it would be easy to hear 
the "police" and "arrest" as part of the statement. However, the court believes that Officer 
Loken said, "Don't move" and, when defendant reacted, he said, "police" and "arrest." 
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The Court recognizes that witnesses' observations and memories may change 
over time and differences may arise. Different witnesses observe and remember things 
differently and, thus, testimony may vary over time and between witnesses. 
The Court went through these few examples of differences in Officer Loken's version of 
events to show the process that the Court went through to make the following findings of the 
fact. Each finding was made based upon the record, considering all versions, the timing of the 
version, context for each version being given, and the corroboration of each version. Based 
upon the record, the Court enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On September 19, 2013, Mr. Raines, a produce clerk at Harmon's Grocery in a nice area 
of Draper in Salt Lake County, went to his vehicle in the West side of the store parking 
lot during his afternoon break. PH 3; EH 2-3, 6, 22, 34. 
2. While walking to his car, Mr. Raines observed in the stall next to his a green Geo Metro 
backed into the stall with a passenger door that was welded shut. EH 3. 
3. When Mr. Raines looked into the Geo, he observed two people, including defendant 
who was "a young man on the passenger side and [defendant] became very suspicious 
as soon as [Mr. Raines] looked over" and "gave him a look or said something to the 
effect-of-wh at--are-youiookinpt"-p 1=1-3;-1:H-377~2;-27;-35. 
4. Mr. Raines observed defendant lurch forward to cover up what was going on. PH 3, 6. 
5. Since the Geo was pulled in backwards and Mr. Raines was pulled in forward, Mr. Raines 
walked around to the other side of the Geo and looked into the Geo through the driver 
side window. EH 3. 
6. Mr. Raines saw "a towel over [defendant's] lap with a bunch of pink balloons sitting on 
top of them and what appeared to [Mr. Raines] to be a transaction between the driver 
and the passenger." EH 3, 7, 22. 
7. Mr. Raines believed he was observing an illegal drug transaction, specifically that 
defendant was "selling narcotics to the driver" and "he assumed it was heroin." EH 4, 
28; Raines and Worthington's witness statements. 
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8. Mr. Raines radioed into the grocery manager, Mr. Worthington, and recalls saying, 
"Craig, you need to come out here there's ... there's a transaction going on right in our 
parking lot on the employee side." EH 5. 
9. Mr. Raines did not describe the type of transaction at that time. EH 5. 
10. Mr. Raines moved his car about 30 feet to the front of the store. PH 4, EH 5. 
11. Mr. Raines met Mr. Worthington and Officer Loken, a part time Harmons' security guard 
in a public safety uniform that looks like a police officer's uniform. PH 4-5, 11; EH 14, 29. 
12. Officer Loken is also a full time conservation officer with the Utah Division of Wildlife 
Resources ("DWS"). PH 2; EH 26. 
13. Officer Loken was not wearing his DWS issued uniform, but was wearing his DWS issued 
safety belt, which included a gun. PH 5, 11-12. 
14. When Mr. Worthington and Officer Loken came out of the store, Mr. Raines pointed out 
the Geo. PH 3-4; EH 5, 14, 27-28. 
15. Mr. Raines told them that when he was taking a break he noticed a green Geo was 
backed into the stall and parked on the west side of the store near his car. When he 
glanced into the Geo, it was occupied by two people and appeared suspicious so he 
stared at them. The passenger, who was later identified as defendant, looked back at 
-·-- ----him-and-gave-him-a-leek-er-s-ald-s-emet·hing-rike~What-are-you-lookin¼t?ll_Mr;-Ra-ines 
believed the passenger in the Geo was selling heroin to the driver; he told Mr. 
Worthington and Officer Loken that the passenger, defendant, "got ... right on his lap 
he's got a hunch of pink balloons going right there." EH 3, 5-7, 14, 22-23, 27-28. 
16. Officer Loken proceeded to the Geo with Mr. Worthington in tow and Mr. Raines 
followed soon thereafter. PH 4, 10; EH 5, 28; Officer Loken, Worthington and Raines' 
witness statements. 
17. Officer Loken approached the Geo to "see what's goin on. 11 PH 4. 
18. Officer Loken approached the rear of the Geo without being noticed and was able to 
look in over the shoulder of the passenger into the passenger compartment of the car. 
PH 4; EH 14, 28, Officer Loken's witness statement. 
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19. Officer Loken observed through the open passenger side window the defendant "with 
like a towel across his lap and he was doing something ... manipulating something 
down there that I really couldn't see, so I bent down closer to try to get a gooder. . . a 
better view of what was going on." PH 5, 10-11; EH 16, 28-29; Officer Loken's witness 
statement. 
20. The driver was looking over toward defendant when she saw Officer Loken and seemed 
startled. PH 5. 
21. Defendant turned and looked at Officer Loken, who said, "Don't move." Officer Loken's 
witness statement; PH 5-6. 
22. Defendant responded by grabbing the center of the towel and shoving it between his 
legs, hunching down toward the floor boards, and yelling to the driver to "take off, take 
off," and "Just drive, just drive" while he was reaching for the gear shift to put the car in 
drive. PH 11; EH 14-15, 18-19, 30. 
23. Officer Loken thought defendant was going for a weapon or had "contraband that he 
was trying to hide or get rid of or do something with." PH 6, 11-13; EH 30; Officer 
Loken's witness statement. 
24. Officer Loken reached in to the open window to control defendant's hands to protect 
--------nimseff-because-weapons-are-ofterrhidden-under-the-se-at-orby-the··p-ass-enger's-fe·et~rl-· -- -- ·----- - ---
6, 13; EH 30-31; Officer Loken's witness statement. 
25. Officer Loken had not seen anything up to that point that showed defendant possessed 
contraband or a weapon. PH 13. 
26. Officer Loken was not told that defendant had a weapon. PH 13; EH 35. 
27. Officer Loken had neither met defendant nor had prior experience with him. PH 13. 
28. As soon as defendant lunged for the floor, pushing everything off of his lap, Officer 
Loken "reached in to grab'em" and said, "Police officer, you're under arrest.'' PH 6, 14; 
EH 30. 
29. Defendant struggled against Officer Loken's restraint. PH 6. 
30. It was a very awkward position for Officer Loken to restrain defendant through the 
window. PH 5-7. 
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31. Officer Loken told defendant, "Just give me your hands." PH 6. 
32. Defendant continued to struggle without being combative or trying to punch Officer 
Loken, but just kept trying to get free. PH 6. 
33. Defendant said to the driver, "Start the car! start the car! Go! Go!" Worthington's 
witness statement; PH 7; EH 31. 
34. When defendant told the driver to start the car, Officer Loken looked into the driver's 
eyes and said, "Don't start the car." PH 7; EH 31. 
35. The driver put up her hands to show she was not going to start the car. PH 7; EH 31. 
36. Mr. Worthington reached in and removed the keys from the ignition. EH 15, 19. 
37. Both Mr. Worthington and Mr. Raines attempted to open the passenger side door, but it 
was welded shut and could not be opened. PH 15; EH 20. 
38. Defendant got his right hand free and reached up towards the driver with a clenched fist 
and said, "Eat it! Eat itl" Officer Lokken and Raines' witness statements; PH 7; EH 31. 
39. Officer Loken told the driver, "Don't eat that" and the driver started to cry. PH 7; EH 31. 
40. Mr. Worthington returned to the driver side door, opened it and pulled the driver out of 
the car and told her to sit down and stay there. PH 15; EH 15, 20; Worthington's witness 
statement. 
---41-.-T-he-d r-iver-eemp Hed ;-EH-15,---20. 
42. Defendant struggled harder against Officer Loken's restraint to the point he twisted up 
over the car seat and "lurched to the back uh the backseaf' so his head was in the back 
of the car with his feet on the passenger seat. PH 7-8; EH 20-21, 31-32. 
43. Officer Loken had a hold of defendant's left hand, but not his right. PH 8; EH 32. 
44. Officer Loken kept saying things to defendant like, "Quit resisting us. Give me your 
hands. You're under arrest." PH 8; EH 31. Mr. Worthington recalled Officer Loken kept 
telling defendant to "Stop. I'm police. Stop, you need to quit resisting. Quit resisting .... 
Stop resisting arrest." EH 19. 
45. Mr. Raines observed defendant "trying to swallow the balloons. So he was literally 
grabbing balloons that kind of got scattered and were trying to swallow them [and Craig 
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and Ray were] trying to stop him from swallowing the balloons." EH 10, 32; Raines and 
Worthington's witness statement. 
46. Mr. Raines "leaned in a little bit to kind of help to stop him from swallowing balloons." 
EH 11. 
47. Mr. Worthington observed defendant shove his hand in his mouth and as he did it, a 
little pink balloon bounced into the rear seat of the Geo. PH 8-9, 15; EH 15, 20-21; 
Worthington's witness statement. 
48. Officer Loken heard Mr. Worthington say that defendant's "trying to swallow 
something." PH 8, 15. 
49. Mr. Worthington grabbed the pink balloon. EH 21; Worthington's witness statement. 
50. Mr. Worthington held it in his right hand, while trying to get control of defendant's right 
hand. EH 15-16, 21. 
51. Officer Loken obtained control of defendant's left hand. PH 8; EH 32. 
52. Officer Loken asked Mr. Raines to grab his handcuffs from his belt because he could not 
reach them. PH 8; EH 32, 34. 
53. Mr. Raines retrieved the handcuffs and put them through the window, so Officer Loken 
could put the handcuffs on defendant's left hand. PH 8; EH 32; Officer Loken and 
Raines' witness statement. 
54. Mr. Worthington had control of the defendant's right hand, so they were able to 
handcuff defendant. PH 8; EH 21, 32. 
55. They removed defendant from the Geo. PH 8; EH 22, 32. 
56. The contents of the pink balloon were field tested by Officer Willie of the Draper City 
Police Department. PH 17. 
57. The balloon contents field test results were positive for heroin. PH 17. 
58. Defendant was charged with one count of possession or use of a controlled substance, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code§ 58-37-8(2)(A)(I) and one count of 
interference with arresting officer, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code § 
76-8-305 on November 14, 2013. 
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LAW 
The "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine" requires that evidence obtained through a 
violation of a constitutional right be excluded. The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The right to be free from warrantless searches 
and seizures is one of the most cherished rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 
State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, ~ 21, 57 P.3d 1052. Fourth Amendment protections apply to 
"activities of sovereign authority and is [generally] not applicable to the searches and seizures 
by any persons other than government officers and agents." State v. Newbold, 581 P.2d 991 
(Utah 1972). However, Fourth Amendment protections still apply to "[a) search conducted by a 
private person acting as the agent of a governmental authority .... " State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 
1219, 1221 (Utah 1988}. 
There are generally three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters between law 
enforcement officers and the public: 
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; [and) (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has 
probable cause to believe an offense had been committed or is being 
committed. State v. Alvey, 2007 UT App 161, ,i 4, 577 Utah Adv. Rep. 15. 
Both parties concede that the encounter between Officer Loken, Mr. Worthington and 
defendant was not a consensual interaction. Consequently, the court focuses on the law of a 
level two investigative detention and level three arrest. A level two seizure is an investigative 
detention. 
Justification for an investigative detention exists when an officer has reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in 
criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion requires a particularized and objective 
basis, supported by specific and articulable facts. Courts should evaluate these 
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facts in their totality, rather than looking at each fact in isolation. Although the 
standard requires more than an inchoate and unparticularized ... hunch .... [i]t 
does not require an officer to rule out innocent conduct or establish the 
likelihood of criminal conduct to the same degree as required for probable 
cause. State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ,J 23, 164 P.3d 397, 581 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Circumstances that might indicate that a level two seizure or investigative detention has 
occurred include "the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the 
officer's request might be compelled." Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App. 55, ,1 11 (internal 
quotations omitted). 
To justify a level three arrest, there must be probable cause that defendant has 
committed or is committing a criminal offense. "Probable cause exists where the facts and 
circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy 
information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief 
that an offense has been or is being committed." State v. Menke, 787 P .2d 537, 542 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990)(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
"Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless undertaken pursuant to a 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. ... [A] search with~ut approval of a judge is 
unreasonable unless subject to one of a few specifically established and well delineated 
exceptions. One such recognized exception is a search incident to a lawful arrest based upon 
probable cause under exigent circumstances." State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, '1122, 57 P.3d 1052, 
456 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
Defendant seeks to suppress a pink balloon field tested positive for heroin because: (1) 
it was discovered by Officer Loken, Mr. Worthington and Mr. Raines while they were acting as 
agents of the state, under the color of law, thereby subjecting the search and seizure to state 
and federal constitutional protections, and (2) the pink balloon was discovered during a 
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warrantless search that lacked constitutional justification, therefore it should be suppressed as 
fruit of the poisonous tree. 
COLOR OF LAW 
Defendant first argues that Officer Loken and those who aided him were acting under 
the color of law, and were required to abide by the Fourth Amendment. 
The state agrees that Officer Loken and Mr. Worthington were acting under color of 
law. However, the state argues Mr. Raines was not acting under color of law, rather Mr. Raines 
was acting as a citizen informant reporting possible criminal activity. 
In reply, defendant did not oppose the state's argument that Mr. Raines was acting as a 
citizen informant. Therefore, there is no dispute that (1) Officer Loken and Mr. Worthington 
were acting under the color of law and were required to abide by the Fourth Amendment, and 
(2) Mr. Raines was acting as a citizen informant, not under the color of law. 
FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE 
Next, defendant argues that Officer Loken and Mr. Worthington violated defendant's 
Fourth Amendment rights by performing an arrest without probable cause, and argues the fruit 
of this search should be suppressed. Specifically, defendant argues that Officer Loken's 
immediate interaction with defendant was to give commands and effect an arrest. Defendant 
, argues he was arrested from the moment of his encounter with Officer Loken and at that time 
there was no probable cause justifying arrest, indeed, that there was not even reasonable 
suspicion. Defendant compares Officer Loken's physical struggle to a Terry frisk. The balloon 
with heroin was discovered in defendant's car because of this unconstitutional arrest. 
Defendant argues that the balloon is the fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation, and therefore 
should be suppressed. 
The state argues that when Officer Loken told defendant "don't move," it was not an 
arrest. Rather, Officer Loken began a level two encounter based on articulable suspicion from a 
citizen informant that defendant was in the middle of a drug deal. The state argues defendant 
throwing his hands to the floor created exigent circumstances that justified Officer Loken 
grabbing his arms. Furthermore, the state argues that when defendant threw his hands to the 
floor, Officer Loken had probable cause to arrest defendant for resisting detention. The state 
14 0000183 
argues that grabbing defendant's arms is not analogous to a Terry frisk because Officer Loken 
was not performing a pat down. The state argues that the balloon is not the result of a Terry 
frisk, it's what is left of defendant's attempt to destroy evidence. The state argues that 
defendant's motion to suppress the balloon should be denied. 
In reply, defendant did not oppose the state's argument that Mr. Raines was acting as a 
citizen informant. However, defendant opposes Mr. Raines's testimony as irrelevant because 
what matters is what Officer Loken knew, not Mr. Raines's knowledge. Defendant argues that 
Officer Loken was not aware that Mr. Raines saw many pink balloons on defendant's lap at the 
time he approached defendant. Officer Loken only knew that Mr. Raines had seen something 
suspicious that might be a drug deal. Officer Loken did not begin a level two stop, he arrested 
defendant at the moment of the encounter. Officer Loken identified himself as a police officer, 
and issued an order that was meant to completely restrict all movement without his 
authorization. A reasonable person would believe he is under arrest, not detained for 
investigatory purposes based upon the facts in this case. Defendant argues that even if this was 
a detention and not an arrest, the seizure was in violation of the Fourth Amendment because 
there was no reasonable suspicion to justify it~ Officer Loken had neither seen a crime 
committed nor had one been described to him. All Officer Loken knew was there was a 
suspicious person possibly involved in a drug deal. There were no exigent circumstances to 
justify Officer Loken's intrusion on defendant. There was no potential destruction of evidence 
because when defendant pushed what was on his lap to the floor, there is no indication that in 
this way any items would have been destroyed. This action did not justify Officer Loken in 
jumping into the passenger window, seizing Mr. Hinmon's arms, handcuffing him and wrestling 
him to the curb. The method of search was not reasonable. Defendant argues that the balloon 
was obtained as the result of an unconstitutional search and seizure and therefore should be 
suppressed. 
The single question of whether the balloon is fruit of the poisonous tree that should be 
suppressed turns on several issues which the Court will address below. 
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LEVEL TWO INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 
The first issue is whether Officer Loken's and Mr. Worthington's initial encounter with 
defendant was a level two investigative detention or a level three arrest. While Officer Loken 
was observing the occupants of the green Geo through the passenger window, the driver 
looked over toward defendant and saw Officer Loken. She seemed startled. Defendant turned 
and looked at Officer Loken, who said, "Don't move." 
Defendant argues this statement amounted to an arrest. The Court disagrees. The 
statement, "don't move," does not amount to an arrest, rather this statement is an assertion of 
official authority associated with a level two detention. Circumstances that might indicate that 
a level two detention has occurred include "the use of language or tone of voice indicating that 
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Salt Lake City v. Ray, supra, 2000 
UT App. at ,i 11. When Officer Loken said, "Don't move," he indicated to defendant and the 
driver that compliance with his request might be compelled. When Officer Loken said, "Don't 
move," he made an official show of authority that a reasonable person would interpret as a 
command to restrict his movements and that he was not free to disregard the officer's request 
or otherwise carry on with his business. The Court concludes that defendant was detained at 
that time, so the Court must next determine whether Officer Loken had adequate grounds to 
justify detaining defendant. 
REASONABLE SUSPICION 
In order to justify a level two investigative detention, the Fourth Amendment requires 
that "the totality of the circumstances show reasonably articulable suspicion that a crime had 
been committed or was being committed as supported by the specific, articulable facts, which, 
together with objective and reasonable inferences, form a basis for suspecting a person 
detained is engaged in criminal activity." An officer's suspicion "cannot be merely an inchoate 
and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.' .... However, '[a] determination that reasonable 
suspicion exists ... need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.' ... Indeed, 'the 
likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls 
considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard."' State v. Markland, 
2005 UT 26, 'f]lO, 112 P.3d 507, 523 Utah Adv. Rep. 34. Courts must "judge the officer's 
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conduct in light of common sense and ordinary human experience and ... accord deference to 
an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions." kl at ,Ill. The 
court should not unduly emphasize the possibility of an innocent explanation of the facts 
witnessed by the officer or follow an overly formalistic approach to the type of testimony that 
an officer must supply in detention cases. !fh at ,I16. 
Officer Loken's and Mr. Worthington's approach to the Geo was based upon Mr. 
Raines's tip. Mr. Raines was a citizen informant. An informant's tip constitutes reasonable 
suspicion to justify a detention or seizure of a vehicle and its occupants "if the information [(1)] 
is reliable, [(2)] provides sufficient detail of criminal activity, and [(3)] is confirmed by the 
investigation officer." State v. Prows, 2007 UT App. 409, ';114, 178 P.3d 908, 594 Utah Adv. Rep. 
21. 
Under the first factor of the citizen informant test, Mr. Raines's tip was reliable because 
Officer Loken and Mr. Worthington knew him and his identifying information. Mr. Raines was 
an uncompensated citizen informant and there were no special circumstances present to 
indicate that the tip was untrustworthy. Thus, Mr. Raines's tip was "highly reliable." See e.g., 
,i1s. 
Under the second factor of the citizen informant test, Mr. Raines must provide "enough 
detail about the criminal activity, i.e., illegal activity observed, description of the vehicle, license 
number and location to support reasonable suspicion." ~ at ~16. Mr. Raines was an 
employee at the same store as Officer Loken and Mr. Worthington. Mr. Raines pointed out the 
vehicle in the parking lot and informed Officer Loken and Mr. Worthington that: (1) he noticed 
a green Geo was backed into the stall, (2) on the west side of the building where employees 
parked, (3) there were two occupants of the Geo, (4) the occupants of the Geo behaved in a 
suspicious manner when Mr. Raines looked at them, (5) he observed defendant had a towel on 
his lap, (6) he observed defendant had pink balloons on his lap, (7) he observed defendant 
moving and manipulating the pink balloons in his lap, (8) based upon his experience, he 
suspected the balloons contained drugs, (9) based upon his experience, he suspected there was 
a drug transaction happening in the green Geo, and (10) he believed the Geo was backed into 
the stall for a quick get-away. The information Mr. Raines gave Officer Loken and Mr. 
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Worthington was sufficiently detailed to satisfy the second factor to establish reasonable 
suspicion. 
Under the third factor of the citizen informant test, a tip is a sufficient basis for 
reasonable suspicion if "the officer can corroborate the tip either by observing the illegal 
activity or by finding the person, the vehicle and the location substantially as described by the 
informant." & at ,t18. Mr. Raines pointed out the green Geo to Officer Loken and Mr. 
Worthington. Officer Loken and Mr. Worthington approached the Geo with the intention of 
seeing what was going on and armed with the information Mr. Raines had given them. 
Specifically, when Officer Loken and Mr. Worthington approached the vehicle, they knew: (1) 
Mr. Raines noticed a green Geo was backed into the stall, (2) on the west side of the building 
where employees parked, (3) there were two occupants of the Geo, (4) the occupants of the 
Geo behaved suspicious when Mr. Raines looked at them, (5) Mr. Raines observed defendant 
had a towel on his lap, (6) Mr. Raines observed defendant had pink balloons on his lap, (7) Mr. 
Raines observed defendant moving and manipulating the pink balloons in his lap, (8) based 
upon his experience, Mr. Raines suspected the balloons contained drugs, (9) based upon his 
experience, Mr. Raines suspected there was a drug transaction happening in the green Geo, 
and (10) Mr. Raines believed the Geo was backed into the stall for a quick get-away. 
Officer Loken approached the rear of the Geo, without being noticed, and was able to 
look in over the shoulder of the passenger into the passenger compartment of the car. Officers 
support their reasonably articulable suspicion based upon their training and experience that 
they suspect illegal activity. For example, officers have asserted reasonably articulable 
suspicion based upon their observations: that verify citizen informant statements, 2 of vehicle 
occupants,3 of aspects of the vehicle itself,4 of the vehicle's position and location.5 Officer 
Loken verified several of Mr. Raines observations with his own. Officer Loken saw (1) the green 
Geo was backed up into the stall, (2) the Geo was parked on the west side where employees 
2 State v. Prows, 2007 UT App. 409, 1114, 178 P.3d 908, 594 Utah Adv. Rep. 21. 
3 State v. Griffith, 2006 UT App. 291, ,18, 141 P.3d 602, 556 Utah Adv. Rep. 4; State v. Beach, 
2002 UT App. 160, ,J9, 47 P.3d 932, 447 Utah Adv. Rep. 17. 
4 State v. Griffith, 2006 UT App. 291, ,t8; see also State v. Beach, supra, 2002 UT App. at ffl9; 
State v. Smith, 833 P.2d 371, 372 (UT App. 1992). 
5 State v. Beach, supra, 2002 UT App. at '1]9; see also State v. Smith, supra, 833 P.2d at 372. 
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parked, (3) the Geo was positioned for a quick get-away, (4) there were two occupants in the 
Geo, (5) there was a towel across defendant's lap, and (6) defendant was manipulating 
something in the towel on his lap. Officer Loken found the people, the vehicle and the location 
substantially as described by Mr. Raines. Although Officer Loken could not see the balloons or 
drugs, the fact that the citizen informant, Mr. Raines, saw them and a majority of his 
statements were verified by Officer Loken's own observations, the third factor regarding 
corroboration is satisfied. In sum, because all three factors regarding sufficiency of a citizen 
informant's tip are satisfied, the Court concludes that Officer Loken had reasonable articulable 
suspicion to effectuate a level two encounter. The totality of the circumstances show 
reasonably articulable suspicion that a crime had been committed or was being committed as 
supported by the specific, articulable facts, which, together with objective and reasonable 
inferences, form a basis for suspecting defendant was engaged in criminal activity. The Court 
concludes the level two investigative detention was justified. 
WARRANTLESS ARREST 
Officer Loken's physical restraint of defendant was effectively a warrantless arrest. 
When a person is physically stopped or restrained by an officer, he is arrested. California v. 
Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551-52, 113 L. Ed 2d 690 (1991). When Officer Loken 
physically restrained defendant, he arrested defendant. 
To make a lawful arrest, an officer must have probable cause to support the arrest. For 
Officer Loken's arrest of defendant to be lawful, there must be probable cause to believe that a 
felony hads been committed or was being committed in his presence. "To determine whether 
an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the 
arrest, and then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an 
objectively reasonable police officer, amount ta1 probable cause." Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 
366,371, 124 S. Ct. 795, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769 (2003). "Probable cause is an objective standard. 
Officers' subjective beliefs, no matter how sincere, about whether they have probable cause, 
standing alone, neither constitute probable cause nor foreclose a finding of probable cause." 
State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 226 {UT App. 1995). As long as probable cause existed at the 
time of the arrest, the reason the officer stated for the arrest is not controlling. Devenpeck v. 
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Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153, 125 S. Ct. 588, 160 L. Ed. 2d 537 (2004). An officer's subjective 
reasons for making an arrest are irrelevant when objective reasons support the arrest. !.f!.:. 
"Determinations of whether probable cause exists require a common sense assessment of the 
totality of the circumstances confronting the arresting or searching officer. Probable cause is 
more than suspicion but less than certainty." State v. Spurgeon, supra, 904 P.2d at 226. 
In dealing with probable cause ... as the very name implies, we deal with 
probabilities. These are not technical; they are factual and practical 
considerations of every day life on which reasonable and prudent [persons], not 
legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what 
must be proved. 
The quantum of evidence needed for probable cause is significantly less 
than that needed to prove guilt .... Utah appellate courts have observed that 
probable cause does not require more than a rationally based conclusion of 
probability, ... and that probable cause is only probability, and not prima fade 
showing, of criminal activity. lfL. at 226-27 (citations omitted; internal quotation 
marks omitted}. 
"[D]eliberatively furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers 
are strong indicia of mens rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the 
officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be considered in 
the decision to make an arrest." State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 511 (UT App. 1989){citing 
Sibron v. New York. 392 U.S. 40, 66-67, 88 S. ct. 1889, 1904:.os, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917 {1968). Acts of 
"concealment or 'furtive movement' ... are certainly relevant in establishing probable cause to 
associate an object with criminal activity." State v. Holmes, supra, 774 P.2d at 511 (citing 
Sibron v. New York, supra, 392 U.S. at 66-67. 
An objective, common sense assessment of the totality of the circumstances 
confronting Officer Loken provided more than suspicion but less than certainty that a crime had 
been or was being committed. Officer Loken told the occupants of the Geo, "Don't move." 
Defendant's reaction was to lunge for the floor, pushing everything off of his lap, and to yell 
"take off, take off," and "Just drive, just drive" while he was reaching for the gear shift to put 
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the car in drive. An officer is entitled to assess the facts in light of his training and experience in 
detecting crime and to make "common sense conclusions about human behavior." United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L. Ed 2d 1 (1989). When a police 
officer makes a level two investigative detention and a person reacts with a deliberate, full 
body movement to push everything off of his lap, in a way that hides what is in his lap, 
deliberately yelling to the driver, "take off, take off," and "just drive, just drive," while he was 
reaching for the gear shift to put the car in drive, the common sense conclusion about the 
person's behavior is that there is criminal activity. Observing a person yell "take off, take off," 
and "just drive, just drive," coupled with the person reaching for the gear shift to put the car in 
drive, along with the person lunging to the floor, pushing everything off of his lap, in a way that 
hides what is in his lap, would have an objectively reasonable police officer believing that there 
is a high probability that there is criminal activity. Examining all of the events leading up to the 
arrest, including from the moment Mr. Raines reported what he saw to Officer Loken to the 
moment Officer Loken grabbed defendant, these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of 
an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause that a crime has been 
committed or is being committed. The Court concludes that Officer Loken lawfully arrested 
defendant. 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH 
While Officer Loken was arresting defendant, Mr. Worthington observed defendant 
shove his hand in his mouth and as he did it, a little pink balloon bounced into the rear seat of 
the Geo. Mr. Worthington grabbed the pink balloon and, after defendant was handcuffed and 
removed from the Geo, he gave it to Officer Loken. Defendant challenges Mr. Worthington's 
warrantless search. 
An exception to the warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest. "(A]n 
arresting officer may, without a warrant, search a person validly arrested.'1 State v. Trane, 2002 
UT 97, ,J23, 57 P.3d 1052, 456 Utah Adv. Rep. 21. "For a search incident to arrest to be 
constitutional, the underlying arrest must be lawful, but it does not need to be supported by an 
arrest warrant." State v. Trane, 2002 UT at ~23. "Under this exception, any evidence, including 
all evidence discovered by serendipity of crimes other than that for which the suspect is 
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arrested, is admissible in a criminal trial." ~ In 2009, the United States Supreme Court 
decision Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009) issued a 
decision narrowing the situation "in which officers can conduct a search incident to arrest to 
times 'when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment at the time of the search 1 or when the police could expect to find evidence of the 
offense for which the arrestee had been arrested." State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, ,i,i 20-21, 229 
P.3d 650, 651 Utah Adv. Rep. 25. "[T]he practical effect of Gant is to prohibit searches of a 
vehicle incident to the arrest of a vehicle occupant absent additional justification." 1£!:_ 
In this case, as stated earlier, Officer Loken had probable cause to arrest defendant, 
therefore it was lawful. Applying the search incident to arrest exception narrowly as provided 
in Gant, the issues are (1) whether the defendant was unsecured and within reaching distance 
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search, and/or (2) whether the police could 
expect to find evidence of the offense for which the arrestee had been arrested. 
While Officer Loken was attempting to arrest defendant, he struggled harder against 
Officer Loken's restraint to the point he twisted up over "lurched to the back uh the backseat11 
so his head was in the back of the car with his feet on the passenger seat. Officer Loken had a 
hold of defendant's left hand, but not his right. Officer Loken kept saying things to defendant 
like, "Quit resisting us. Give me your hands. You're under arrest." Mr. Worthington recalled 
Officer Loken kept telling defendant to "Stop. I'm police. Stop, you need to quit resisting. Quit 
resisting .... Stop resisting arrest." Mr. Worthington observed defendant shove his 
unrestrained hand in his mouth and as he did it, a little pink balloon bounced into the rear seat 
of the Geo. Mr. Worthington, grabbed the pink balloon and, after defendant was handcuffed 
and removed from the Geo, he gave it to Officer Loken. These facts fit squarely within the first 
narrow Gant exception. The defendant was unsecured and within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment at the time Mr. Worthington grabbed the pink balloon, which he 
witnessed defendant drop into the back seat while defendant was swallowing or trying to 
swallow the drug filled pink balloons. The Court concludes the pink balloon was obtained 
lawfully as a search incident to arrest. 
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In summary, the Court concludes the initial encounter was a level two investigative 
detention with reasonably articulable suspicion, which escalated into an arrest with probable 
cause that a crime had been committed or was being committed, and a search incident to a 
lawful arrest resulted in a pink balloon that tested positive for heroin. The Court concludes the 
exclusionary rule does not apply to suppress the pink bal!oon and test results because the 
evidence was not obtained unlawfully and therefore is not fruit of the poisonous tree. 
ORDER 
The Court DENIES defendant's Motion to Suppress for Unconstitutional Search and 
Seizure. This is the FINAL ORDER of the Court. No additional orders are necessary. 
Date: 4j ~ I ?bl4 
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